by Olav Dirkmaat via GoldRepublic,
The Chinese account for over a third of total gold demand. We know
therefore that any development in China - either positive or negative -
has a rippling effect on gold, as well as other commodities that were
bid up to new record heights during the Chinese credit bubble.
But the problem in China is not only an overextension of
credit and an urgently needed deleveraging of its banking sector. It is,
more importantly, the cleansing of a miscoordination of economic
resources. The issue at hand is therefore not the total level
of credit, but the micro-economic catastrophy that an inflow of
excessive credit causes.
The magic of capitalism is that profit margins are driven by
(derived) consumer demand: higher consumer demand leads to higher profit
margins that in turn attract investors. The benefiting industries expand at the expense of other industries that experience lower consumer demand.
Excessive credit, however, provides investors with the very same signal as if consumer demand has increased.
Yet this is not the case. Investors will make investments that are not
sustainable and will turn into lousy investments as soon as prices
throughout the economy readjust to the new amount of credit.
How does this process work?
When central banks distort the healthy clearing process between
commercial banks by using their bottomless wallet, an excess of credit
over savings develops. This credit ends up in the hands of entrepreneurs
that bid up certain market prices: they exercise their increased buying
power in some sectors of the economy. They bring about a price increase
in some goods, above the level at which they would have settled without
the inflow of new credit, but that remain uncompensated by a decrease
in prices of other goods. They cause an increase in profit margins and
free cash flow in markets to which the additional credit flows; an
irrefutable micro-economic signal for investors to invest in these lines
of production. A temporary boom ensues.
This boom cannot continue forever. The new credit - in the
form of bank deposits - will eventually bid up prices throughout the
entire economy. All prices readjust upward over time. As money
trickles down, other people will bid for the goods they desired and
desire with their newly obtained increased nominal buying power. Instead
of entrepreneurs bidding up prices of production goods, consumers now
bid up prices of consumer goods. The credit-driven demand in some
sectors stalls, while all other prices rise to reflect the impact of the
newly created credit on the broad money supply.
This is exactly what happened in China. Massive
amounts of credit went into the real estate sector. Prices were bid up
and an unsustainable boom developed. And as long as the amount of new
credit outstrips the upward readjustment of prices following from the
previous credit injections, the party continues. But as soon as the
amount of new credit inevitably dwindles, the readjustment of prices to
the new credit comes to a closure by means of a full-blown recession.
The key to understanding this theory is the fact that the
real problem is not about the credit supply. It is about the
miscoordination of production due to an excess of credit over savings.
When banks are no longer limited in their credit expansion by the
competitive clearing process, for example because of a significant
increase in base money by the central bank, saved-up (unconsumed)
resources have in fact not increased, but entrepreneurs invest as if
saved-up resources, available to production, have increased. The boom is
temporary and will inevitably burst into a recession as soon as the
market readjusts prices again.
Sharp observers can see the unravelling of this process in
full force in China. The CPI indicates rising consumer prices, while
production slumps with a PPI revealing declining producer prices. Recent PMI-figures are also abysmal. It is an undeniable sign of a credit bubble ready to burst.
But what does this mean for future gold prices?
The Chinese demand for gold essentially comes from three segments:
(1) the People’s Bank of China; (2); the banking sector; and (3) Chinese
citizens.
We can count on the Chinese central bank to pursue the same
steady course they have been pursuing for a while: buying additional
gunpowder by increasing their gold reserves. The PBoC has been
very secretive about the pace at which they expand their gold hoard.
Analysts estimate that the PBoC bought as much as 490 tons gold on the
market in 2011. With declining prices, who believes that they are buying
less now?
In 2009 Yi Gang, Vice Governor of the PBoC, commented that Chinese
gold reserves equalled about 1.000 tonnes then, and could reach 6.000
tonnes by 2013 and even 10.000 tonnes by the end of the decade. That
presupposes an increase of approximately 1.000 tonnes annually. Chinese
gold production is roughly 400 tonnes, so that leaves us with 600 tonnes
to be imported each year. Given recent price declines, China might
decide to take advantage of such an opportunity. According to the World
Gold Council, gold demand equals give and take 4.500 tonnes, thus PBoCs
influence on gold prices is considerable at around 13% of total gold
demand.
On the other end, Chinese commercial banks themselves are of little
relevance for gold. As the banking sector has to deleverage - with
Chinese authorities insisting on taking some pain — banks will try to
exchange their assets for hard (how ironic) currency. Yet interest rates
paid for savings deposits are still pegged by the PBoC to its own
benchmark.
More importantly, it is very likely that the deleveraging
will be accompanied by, for instance, a significant cut in interest
rates or a lowering of the reserve requirements to offer the banking
sector a helping hand.
This could have a major impact on gold. We’ll see why by observing
that the bulk of Chinese gold demand comes from its third source: Chinese
citizens. China has one of the world's highest saving rates, and the
public faces few investment options. With negative real interest rates,
in case the PBoC does lower rates to support the banking system, gold
seems to be an opportune alternative. In this light, it is
interesting to see a close correlation between the gold price and
changes in Chinese consumer prices (with the exception of the past few
months). From 1993 to 2013 correlation between the gold price
and the Chinese CPI was .80, while over the past ten years it equalled a
stunning .97! We should nonetheless reiterate the often heard mantra that correlation does not equal causation.
The main driver of increasing gold demand from China should therefore
be the general public. Gold demand of the Chinese public equates to
around 800 tonnes a year, but could increase in accordance with the
Chinese slowdown.
Yet we should also consider the other side of the coin. In the short
run things might take another turn. Interest rates on bank deposits are
capped to 110% of the discount rate offered by the PBoC. When an
economic slowdown inevitably sets in, consumer prices might get dragged
down in an ensuing recessionary offshoot, increasing the real return on
bank deposits. Inflation and PBoC rate cuts, however, would avoid this
scenario.
It will be undoubtedly interesting to see how the Chinese slowdown will unfold. Chinese gold demand will be key to gold prices in the near and more distant future due to sheer size. It is unfortunate that most pundits nevertheless choose to focus their attention on the cherished Western world.